original understanding supporting incorporation was so clear, why did contemporary judges reject the idea so overwhelmingly? 10 The most common response is that the Supreme Court gave the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a stingy and erroneous reading in the SlaughterHouse Cases" and set back incorporation for decades. 12 This Article rejects the conventional interpretation of Slaughter-House and offers another explanation for incorporation's demise that rests in equal measure on an unlucky sample of cases and on the unintended consequences of constitutional politics in the 1890s. 16 A careful examination reveals nothing in Slaughter-House that is inconsistent with incorporation. 17 Indeed, no federal opinion prior to 1900 construed the case as contrary to extending the Bill of Rights to the states. The antiincorporation reading did not emerge until Maxwell v. Dow, which was decided three decades after Slaughter-House. 1 8 By this time, though, incorporation had been undermined by two independent developments.
First, virtually all of the cases that squarely raised incorporation between 1873 and 1900 involved procedural claims. 19 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64, 69 (1972) (calling Slaughter-House "one of the most tragically wrong opinions ever given by the Court"). REV. 536, 548 (1891) (noting that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which Slaughter-House listed among those citizens' rights protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment, "is granted in the same way and by the same instrument as the immunity from cruel and unusual punishments: [t] he former is conferred by the original Constitution and the latter by one of the amendments"); Horace Stern, Samuel Freeman Miller, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 539, 560-61 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1909) (stating that "the rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the 'Bill of Rights' or original constitutional amendments" were included in Justice Miller's category of national rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE TRAGEDY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS
18. 176 U.S. 581, 591 (1900) (treating the federal privileges listed in Slaughter-House as exhaustive and concluding that a jury trial "right, such as is claimed here, was not mentioned, and we may suppose it was regarded as pertaining to the state and not covered by the [Fourteenth] amendment"), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
19. Three types of cases from this period involved incorporation but did not squarely raise the issue. First, there were suits where someone cited the relevant portion of the Bill of Rights directly instead of relying on the Fourteenth Amendment. In these cases, the Court dismissed the claim because of In other words, the Court rarely dealt with litigants seeking protection for religious freedom, for free speech, or from unreasonable searches and seizures. Instead, the courts got a steady diet of cases seeking to invoke a right to a civil jury trial or grand jury indictment, both of which are still not applied to the states. 20 This pattern was significant because lawyers at this time drew a sharp distinction between substantive rights, which were fundamental and unalterable, and procedural forms, which were subject to improvement and should not be constitutionally fixed. 21 Thus, the initial cases that raised inthat pleading error. See Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 325-26 (1868) (rejecting Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims against a state court conviction); Newsom, supra note 17, at 721-22 (examining the Twitchell decision). Second, there were cases where incorporation was not raised in the lower court, which resulted in procedural default. See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (rejecting a claim that the Second Amendment applied to the states because "if the fourteenth amendment limited the power of the States as to such rights, as pertaining to citizens of the United States, we think it was fatal to this claim that it was not set up in the trial court"); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 557-58 (1874) (dismissing an incorporation question because "no such error was assigned in the [state court], and that the question was not presented to, nor was it decided by, the [state court]"). Finally, there were cases where incorporation was arguably before the Court, but its decision rested on other grounds. See, e.g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 100-05 (1878) (stating that the Takings Clause did not bind the states, but rejecting the asserted claim on general due process grounds); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-54 (1875) (discussing the application of the Petition Clause and the Second Amendment to the states but relying on the lack of state action for its holding). This Article only addresses the last of these three categories, as the cases in that set must be analyzed before they can be distinguished. See infra text accompanying notes 89-104.
20. See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175-77 (1899) (rejecting a claim that a jury selection procedure was inconsistent with due process); Eilenbacker v. Dist. Court, 134 U.S. 31, 35-40 (1890) (rejecting a claim that a criminal contempt proceeding in state court without a jury trial violated due process); Ex parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131, 167-81 (1887) (denying an application for a writ of error for an incorporation claim based on the protection against self-incrimination and the right to an impartial jury trial); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that the Fifth Amendment grand jury right did not bind the states); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) ("A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the State courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge."); Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 149-50 (1872) (rejecting an argument that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the states from making a criminal accusation by "information," which is proffered by the prosecutor, rather than by indictment, which requires a grand jury under the Fifth Amendment); cf. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1880) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies.... Each state prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding.").
21. See Brown, 175 U.S. at 175 ("The state is not tied down by any provi-corporation drew from a distorted sample-in the area where support for the idea was at its ebb-and created precedents that made it easier for the Court to reject the entire concept later. Second, growing unrest during the 1890s, which was associated with the Populist Party, poisoned the well against incorporation on substantive matters by persuading legal elites that states needed wide latitude to suppress dissent. 22 In a sense, this is a tale about how the threat of disorder leads to curbs in civil liberties. 23 That is a familiar story in wartime, but the link between these domestic disturbances-most notably the Pullman Strike of 1894-and the failure of incorporation is often overlooked. 24 While the evidence about the effect of these sion of the Federal Constitution to the practice and procedure which existed at the common law.. . . [lit may avail itself of the wisdom gathered by the experience of the century to make such changes as may be necessary."); supra text accompanying note 1. 24. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886) (rejecting an incorporation claim based on the First and Second Amendments made by a labor militia, in part to honor "the right of the State to disperse assemblages organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent on riot and rapine"); cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 597-98 (1895) (upholding the use of contempt proceedings to crush the Pullman Strike with the admonition that "it is a lesson which cannot be learned too soon or too thoroughly that under this government . . . no wrong, real or fancied, carries with it legal warrant to invite as a means of redress the cooperation of a mob, with its accompanying acts of violence"). For more on the tumultuous events of this decade, see generally H.W. BRANDS, THE RECKLESS DECADE: AMERICA IN THE 1890S, at 1 (1995), which comments on the anxiety and "fin-de-si&le soul searching" felt by Americans at the close of the nineteenth century and the dawn of the twentieth; OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 53-74 (1993), which tracks the events that coincided with the expansion of state power to maintain order against labor movements in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS 1865-1896, at 559-708 (1938), for an illustration of the anger over economic circumstances that led to the formation of the Populist Party and the presidential campaign of William Jennings Bryan; DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE (1999), for a discussion of the causes and consequences of the Pullman Strike; and THE events on incorporation doctrine is circumstantial, the antiPopulist backlash offers the best explanation for the Court's refusal to incorporate almost all substantive portions of the Bill of Rights at the turn of the twentieth century.
Part I examines Slaughter-House and demonstrates, largely by referring to contemporary commentary on the case, that the opinion was not hostile to incorporation. 25 Part II explores the cases that addressed incorporation in the following two decades and shows that they were almost entirely based on procedural claims, which were treated differently from substantive ones. Part III looks at the protests that terrified the political establishment during the 1890s and argues that the reaction to these protests put the final nail in incorporation's coffin. Finally, the Conclusion applies these lessons to the issue of whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated and finds that precedent and history counsel in favor of incorporation.
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I. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE UNVARNISHED
The prime suspect in the murder of incorporation is the decision in Slaughter-House, 2 7 but this Part argues that the charge is false. Not only was the opinion ambiguous on the question, but until 1900 no federal judges or academics read the case as authority for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the Bill of Rights to the states. 28 Slaughter-House, like many so-called great cases, only became definitive on this issue due to subsequent events.
POPULIST MIND (Norman Pollack ed., 1967), which mines turn-of-the-century primary sources in order to uncover the ideals and aims of the Populist party.
25. 
A. ILLUSTRATIVE OR EXHAUSTIVE: AN INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM
Almost everyone agrees that the holding of SlaughterHouse does not speak to the incorporation issue. 29 Nevertheless, the opinion is considered highly relevant because of its analysis of the rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 In rejecting a claim by a group of butchers that the new constitutional text invalidated a state monopoly that barred them from pursuing their livelihood,31 the Court stated that there was a distinction between national rights, which were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 and common-law rights traditionally secured by state law, which were not. 33 The opinion then "ventured to suggest some [rights] which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." 34 Each citizen had the right: sage in the opinion with respect to incorporation and is the principal source of confusion about Slaughter-House. 37 One possible reading of this language is that the Court's omission of the Bill of Rights, with the exception of the Petition Clause, was a rejection of incorporation.
38 This is the view taken by most commentators, 39 an interpretation that is reinforced by the trivial quality of the rights that were included in the Court's catalog. 40 After all, why would the Justices mention things like seaport access or the right to travel but ignore the freedom of speech or the right to a jury trial if they thought that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the Bill of Rights? This might make sense, though, if the Court was saying that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was declaratory of rights that existed against the states prior to the Fourteenth Amendment or applied only to rights that were inherent in the federal structure. The other interpretation is that Slaughter-House's discussion of national rights was illustrative and not exhaustive, which if correct would not undermine incorporation. Indeed, the Court's statement that it was describing "some" of the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment supports this open-ended construction. 42 Other commentators go further and argue that the recitation of the Petition Clause should be taken as evidence that the Bill of Rights was fully incorporated. 43 This view rests on the fact that the Court counted among the category of "national rights" the ones in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which suggests that privileges created by the constitutional text, not just structural rights or ones that were around before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, were included. 44 ing "those preexisting rights the Bill of Rights merely protects from federal invasion"); Bogen, supra note 28, at 343 ("[T]he natural inference is that Miller was listing the privileges of national citizenship that existed when the amendment was adopted, not changing their substance."); Newsom, supra note 17, at 678 ("Admittedly, a number of the freedoms Miller mentionedsuch as the right to access seaports and to use navigable waterways-have little, if anything, to do with the 'Constitution'; they are structural rights . . . ."); Pence, supra note 17, at 540-41 ("[T]he clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in question created no new privileges and immunities; it had reference only to existing privileges.",).
42. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 77 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The Court enumerated some, but refused to enumerate all of these national rights."); cf. Newsom, supra note 17, at 681 ("Given Miller's general inclination to avoid unnecessary pronouncements of constitutional law, it is most reasonable to read his list-and particularly his reference to the right of assembly and the privilege of habeas corpus-as merely illustrative of the sorts of rights that he thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected, not as exhaustive of those rights.").
43. See, e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 37, at 1128 ("One of these rights, that of 'free assembly and petition,' is one of those covered by the first eight amendments. The Justice's 'suggestion' of this right was, then, susceptible of being taken as an indication that all the rights covered by the first eight amendments had been made good against the states . . . ."); Newsom, supra note 17, at 680 ("Having expressly invoked the right of assembly and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, it is hard to imagine why Miller would have thought that other textually specified freedoms (including many of those enumerated in the Bill of Rights) should not follow as well. 49. Reliance on the congressional record from this era is problematic. See Bogen, supra note 28, at 375 ("These congressional remarks are not convincing evidence of the meaning of the majority opinion in Slaughter-House. The only members of Congress who expressly took the incorporation reading were southern Democrats opposed to the proposed civil rights laws."); Wildenthal, supra note 39, at 1116-25 (pointing out that during the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1875 some Democrats in Congress adopted the view that the Bill of Rights was totally incorporated).
B. THE SOUND OF SILENCE
When the search turns to federal cases before 1900 that cite Slaughter-House as standing for an anti-incorporation reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, the result is . .. nothing. 50 Absolutely nothing. This is startling given that the opinion is supposed to be so hostile to the application of the Bill of Rights to the states. And it is not just startling, it is telling about the uncertainty surrounding the case. 51 Judges frequently referred to Slaughter-House, of course, but they did so for other points of law. For example, the case was sometimes cited for its holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect common-law contract and property rights. 52 At other times the decision was used as authority for the general view that there was a distinction between the privileges or immunities under state law and those guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 53 But in no case did a federal court say that Slaughter-House meant that the Bill of Rights was not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. This raises an obvious question: where did that interpretation come from?
The answer is that the Justices themselves arrived at this view in Maxwell, a 1900 case rejecting the claim that a state 50. Cf. Pence, supra note 17, at 536-37 (stating that in 1891 the question of incorporation was "one of great interest and importance and [was] comparatively untouched by direct judicial precedent"). I cannot find any cases-state or federal-giving Slaughter-House a pro-incorporation reading.
51. conviction rendered by a jury of eight-instead of the traditional twelve-was invalid because the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was a privilege or immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. 54 Petitioner contended that "all the provisions contained in the first ten amendments, so far as they secure and recognize the fundamental rights of the individual as against the exercise of Federal power, are . . . to be regarded as privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States . . . ."55 In response, the Court quoted extensively from SlaughterHouse and concluded in the opinion's crucial section on national rights that "[a] right, such as is claimed here, was not mentioned, and we may suppose it was regarded as pertaining to the State, and not covered by the amendment."
56 Thus, Maxwell endorsed the "exhaustive" reading of Slaughter-House and fixed the Court's hostility toward the Bill of Rights for the next century.
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In sum, the decisive blow against incorporation came in 1900, not when the Court decided Slaughter-House. This raises two questions: (1) why did this happen in 1900; and (2) what events might have shaped the Justices' thinking in the intervening years?
II. A PROCEDURAL PATH
This Part explores incorporation doctrine from the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment until Maxwell. The most notable fact about these cases is that they largely concerned the procedural parts of the Bill of Rights (such as the grand jury, civil jury, and petit jury) rather than the substantive ones (for example, free speech, the right to bear arms, and freedom of religion). 5 58. This observation is certainly correct with respect to federal cases, and appears to be true for state decisions as well, although I have not read every tant to bind the states with procedures that were considered relatively unimportant and subject to improvement. 59 Thus, most litigants who brought incorporation claims did so on the weakest possible grounds and created precedents that proved harmful to the broader idea.
A. THE SPIRIT OF PROGRESS VERSUS ETERNAL TRUTHS
What jumps out from the early cases that addressed incorporation (and were free of waiver issues or an alternative ground of decision) is that they focused on civil or criminal procedure. For ) ; infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. One explanation for this distinction is that the gap between procedural protections in the Federal Constitution and state constitutions tilted the claims in the procedural direction because litigants in states without those protections would have had a clear reason to invoke the federal right. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It could hardly have occurred to these States that by ratifying the Amendment they uprooted their established methods for prosecuting crime and fastened upon themselves a new prosecutorial system."). Moreover, issues such as the grand jury and civil jury rights were basically binary-you either got one or you did not. A claim based on the deprivation of one of these was more likely to be decided than one based on a right with substantive content, because a court could easily reject the argument on the merits while assuming arguendo that incorporation was applicable. The rationale in these decisions (to the extent that there was one) was that it would be unreasonable to extend these procedural rules because doing so would hinder legal progress. 64 Rowan v. State 65 is a good example of this view and was the first major case to reject incorporation. In response to a claim that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to use grand jury indictment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause did not "confine the states to a particu-61. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (rejecting the argument that charging a criminal defendant by prosecutorial information instead of grand-jury indictment "after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law").
62. See Ex parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131, 167-80 (1887) (reviewing the voir dire proceedings of the challenged jurors); id. at 180-81 (concluding that petitioners' Fourth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted). Spies presents two special problems. First, because petitioners brought the case on an application for a writ of error, the Court assumed that the incorporation claims were valid and rejected the Fifth and Sixth Amendment arguments on the merits. See id. at 179-81; Pence, supra note 17, at 547 ("The practice [for writs of error] is to deny the application when it is manifest upon inspection of the record that the Federal questions involved were rightly decided."); Wildenthal, supra note 9, at 1491 (" [ 64. Although the text focuses on nineteenth-century views of this question, the sentiments expressed then carried over into the twentieth century. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("A construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights ... would deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for extending the area of freedom.").
65. A decade later, the same question was presented to the United States Supreme Court in Hurtado, and the explanation given there was even more emphatic about the need for experimentation. 69 The Court denied that a long-established practice-even one rooted in the text of the Constitution-was required by due process, and to hold otherwise "would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement." 70 Fundamental liberties were best "preserved and developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government." 7 1 Accordingly, the Constitution "must be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property."
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These incorporation precedents indicate that procedural rights were viewed less favorably than substantive privileges for two reasons. First, procedure was just a means to an end that could vary between jurisdictions without doing much harm. 73 Second, these forms were not sacrosanct because, in what today might be called "living constitutionalism," there was a strong belief that they could be improved with experience. 74 While these two arguments are treated more skeptically today, they still retain some force in the sense that there is no clamor for overruling Walker or Hurtado to incorporate the civil and grand jury requirements. In these cases, there really is a sense that the Bill of Rights is protecting a form that is not essential (or even good) for achieving justice.
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The distinction between procedure and substance also wields a considerable (though hidden) influence over the scholarly debate about the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Charles Fairman relied heavily on the grand jury in his famous attack on incorporation.
7 6 He noted that when the Amendment was ratified most states did not require grand jury indictments, yet almost nobody in those states raised this point during the ratification debates. Thus, he argued that those state officials must not have thought that the Bill of Rights was applicable to them. 7 7 By contrast, pro-incorporation authors
73.
See supra text accompanying note 1 (suggesting that the procedures set forth in the Bill of Rights were "peculiar," and not "fundamental," to AngloAmerican law); see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62-63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that requiring indictment-based prosecutions and court trials for petty civil cases, or prohibiting prosecutors from drawing adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to testify "is, in de Tocqueville's phrase, to confound the familiar with the necessary").
74. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("A construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights . .. would deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for extending the area of freedom.").
75. 78 The problem is that each side in this interpretive debate is drawing a general conclusion about incorporation from its own perspective instead of conceding that there was a real difference between procedural and substantive rights in the post-Reconstruction era. house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ."86 While this was a strong endorsement of incorporation, Field's phrasing implied that at least some procedural rights, which were not "rights of the person," should not apply to the states. 87 Perhaps this was just a nod to prior cases like Walker and Hurtado, but it can also be read as affirming that the line between procedure and substance was significant in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 8 years"); see also Wildenthal, supra note 9, at 1494-95 (describing the Vermont statute).
83. See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331-32. 84. See id. at 359 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that when jurisdiction is established, the Justices "may look into the whole record" and take up issues that were raised in state court); id. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It is true the assignments of error do not, in terms, cover this point, but it is competent for this court to consider it, because we have jurisdiction . . . 85. Id. at 363 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id.
87. See AMAR, supra note 12, at 228 ("Field went on to distinguish between those aspects of the Bill that were mere 'limitations on power' and those that instead 'declare or recognize the rights of persons."' (quoting O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 363 (Field, J., dissenting))). To be fair, Justice Field did include the right against self-incrimination in his discussion of privileges or immunities, so his analysis cannot be reduced to a simple line between procedure and substance. See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 363 ("The state cannot ..
. compel [a United
States citizen] to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution.").
88. Justice Harlan's dissent, by contrast, backed Justice Field's view about the Eighth Amendment but did not suggest that procedural rights were excluded. See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Slince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, no one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty or property, recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, can be denied or abridged by a State in respect to any person within its jurisdiction. These rights are, principally, enumerated in the earlier Amendments of the Constitution."); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
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B. POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS DOCTRINAL PATTERN
My claim that the initial cases on incorporation were mostly about procedure, where support for the proposition was weak, as opposed to substantive claims, where there was more enthusiasm for the idea, must address two possible exceptions: United States v. Cruikshank 8 9 and Davidson v. New Orleans. 90 A close survey of those cases establishes that they do not undermine the analytic framework just articulated.
Cruikshank made some critical comments about the incorporation of the First and Second Amendments, which are, of course, substantive rights rather than procedural forms. 9 1 Petitioners killed African Americans for organizing a militia and were convicted of participating in a mob that deprived the victims of their assembly rights and their right to bear arms. 92 The Court reversed these convictions and declared that the First Amendment secured the right of assembly only "against congressional interference," and for any additional protection, "the people must look to the States." 93 Likewise, the Court said 516, 539 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that procedural protections such as the grand jury were fundamental).
92 U.S. 542 (1875). For a detailed narrative of the events surrounding
Cruikshank, see CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MAS-SACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (Henry Holt & Co. ed., 2008).
96 U.S. 97 (1877).
91. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53 (stating that the First and Second Amendments are not supposed to limit the state governments).
92. See id. at 548, 551-53; Newsom, supra note 17, at 712 (explaining that the petitioners in Cruikshank "attacked and killed a group of more than sixty black citizens" and were convicted of interfering with their rights to assemble and bear arms); Wildenthal, supra note 39, at 1148-49 (noting that the facts of the Cruikshank case resulted from the violent Colfax massacre).
93. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552, 556-57. It is not clear what the Court meant here. See id. at 552 (observing that the rights of assembly and petition, ''or for any thing else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States"); see id. at 552-53 (stating that the indictment did not allege that the defendants were trying to prevent a petition meeting); Newsom, supra note 17, at 714-16 (arguing that there was a difference between the right to petition the government, which was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right to assemble for other purposes, which was just a common-law right). But see Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552 ("The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."); Wildenthal, supra note 39, at 1158 (suggesting that the Court was describing a structural right of assembly, not the First Amendment right); sources cited supra note 41 (po-that the Second Amendment secured the right to bear arms, but that this meant nothing "more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress." 94 Standing alone, both statements cast serious doubt on the idea that the substantive parts of the Bill of Rights attracted more support with respect to incorporation.
These negative comments, however, must be discounted because the Court also made it clear that the convictions were invalid because the petitioners were private actors rather than state actors. 9 5 Cruikshank held:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society. 96 Indeed, the Court emphasized the lack of state action in its decision with respect to the Second Amendment issue, explaining that this text "leave[s] the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes" to state law. 9 7 This stress on violations by "fellowcitizens" rather than by the state should be read, in conjunction with Cruikshank's holding, as an indication that the analysis of incorporation was not applicable to state violations. 9 Davidson could be read as contrary to extending the Bill of Rights, but that argument also collapses under scrutiny. The petitioner in that case argued that a state assessment on a certain parcel of property violated the Due Process Clause. 100 In rejecting this claim, the Court held:
[I]t is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law, been deprived of his property, when, as regards the issues affecting it, he has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case.' 0 '
Then the Davidson court added that "[i]f private property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it must be remembered that, when the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth amendment with the one we are construing, was left out. . . ."102 But this line about the Takings Clause was dictum, as there is no evidence that a takings claim was made or preserved. 103 In fact, when the Justices extended the Takings Clause to the states, they cited Davidson with approval and did not mention its contrary language. 104 Thus, a more reasonable interpretation of Davidson is that the Court was just applying the principle from Slaughter-House that the Fourteenth Amendment did not cover common-law rights.
In sum, a review of the case law on incorporation from the 1870s until 1900 offers at least a partial explanation for the Court's rejection of the idea in Maxwell. First, there was great skepticism about extending the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the states. Second, the litigation that clearly raised incorporation during this period was nearly all about (stating that Cruikshank "held that the Second Amendment does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the federal government"). procedural issues. What emerged was a series of precedents that were later cited by the Justices as support for the view that incorporation as a whole was invalid. 0 5 A different picture might have developed if these initial decisions had grappled with substantive claims against state action and built some positive momentum behind the incorporation project.10 6 Nevertheless, this argument falls short in one respect. The Justices did not draw a procedurallsubstantive distinction in Maxwell, nor did they embrace the incorporation of all of the substantive provisions in the Bill of Rights following O'Neil. Something else was at work outside of the Court.
III. PANIC AND DISINCORPORATION
This Part argues that enthusiasm for extending the substantive protections of the Bill of Rights to the states evaporated during the 1890s because of the sharp increase in agrarian radicalism and labor protests. Fear of what these events meant for property rights persuaded legal elites that state authorities needed greater latitude to suppress dissent, which was hard to square with the idea that fundamental rights should be ex- 106. One final piece of evidence that supports the Court's "two-tiered" approach to the Bill of Rights comes from Downes v. Bidwell, which was quoted at the beginning of this Article and made the distinction explicit. See supra text accompanying note 1. Downes was one of the Insular Cases, a group of cases that examined whether the Constitution applied to the territories acquired by the United States during the Spanish-American War. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 249 (1901) (discussing whether the revenue clauses of the Constitution "extend of their own force to our newly acquired territories"). This question was analogous to the incorporation issue, which considered whether the Bill of Rights applied to the states. panded. 107 While this hypothesis is more difficult to prove than the doctrinal pattern discussed in Part II, the conclusion that widespread civil unrest led to the demise of incorporation rings true because it builds on a basic truth: when security threats increase, civil liberties retreat.
A. THE PROSPECT OF MOB RULE
To understand why the incorporation of the substantive parts of the Bill of Rights mostly failed at the turn of the twentieth century, it is necessary to explore how political conditions in the 1890s reshaped judicial attitudes. The analysis starts by looking at three pieces of evidence: (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Presser v. Illinois;108 (2) the increase in protests that occurred after 1892;109 and (3) an 1893 speech by Justice David Brewer 1 0 -one of the three dissenters who supported the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment in O'Neil."'
Presser and Signs of Trouble
Let us begin with Presser, an 1886 case that involved Illinois's attempt to regulate armed workers' associations.
1 12 In response to the violence that often greeted strikes, a GermanAmerican labor group called Lehr und Wehr Verein began drilling its members in military tactics to prepare for future confrontations. 113 An alarmed state legislature retaliated by pass-
107.
See infra text accompanying notes 160-65 and accompanying text; cf. Edward S. Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 17 AM. HIST. REV. 52, 66 (1911) (stating that in the mid-1890s "the Supreme Court began to regard itself as the last defense of the country against socialism").
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
109. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 24, at 38 (noting that the Homestead Strike of 1892 was one example of how laborers "in the early 1890s confronted capitalism in massive, bitter, and often violent ways"). 113. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 254; Halbrook, supra note 112, at 947 ("Founded in reaction to election fraud and police violence, the Lehr und Wehr ing a law that barred any group other than the state militia and federal troops from "associat[ing] themselves together as a military company or organization, or to drill or parade with arms in any city, or town, of this State" without a license. 114 As a local paper stated, this was "intended to afford to life and property and the public peace by denying to bands of Socialists and Communists the privilege of appearing with arms at drill or parade." 115 The Court upheld this statute against an incorporation challenge based on the assembly-and-petition right. 116 (Presser also made a Second Amendment claim, but that was dismissed because he did not cite the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 17 ) Though the Court said that assembly-and-petition was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship and quoted the First Amendment to that effect, Presser held that the right to peaceably assemble did not extend to militias because they did not issue petitions. 118 But the Court did not stop there: it went on to say that the exercise of state authority over militias "is necessary to the public peace, safety and good order. To deny the power would be to deny the right of the State to disperse assemblages organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent on riot and rapine." 119 Since the militia in Presser never engaged in any violence, the "riot and rapine" language is curious.
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Verein modeled itself on the republican tradition of the armed citizen militia .... ); LaRue, supra note 23, at 387 (noting that "the organization of 'selfdefense' associations" increased as a response to the Great Strike of 1877).
114. Presser, 116 U.S. at 253. 115. Halbrook, supra note 112, at 956 (referring to the Chicago Daily Times Herald) (internal quotation marks omitted). Presser represents a crucial inflection point in the incorporation story. In one respect, the case can be read as an actual incorporation of the Petition Clause, which the Court described as a First Amendment right that was absorbed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 21 On the other hand, the Court's rejection of Presser's claim on the merits contained language that raised concern about what would happen if these rights were extended to groups like his. 122 What if the objects of state regulation were armed groups bent on overthrowing the political order? Would the application of the Bill of Rights cripple efforts to stop them? This concern was far-fetched in the 1880s, but that was about to change.
See Presser
A Surge of Discontent
Frustration with Gilded Age economic arrangements was mounting prior to the 1890s, but that anger boiled over during the devastating Panic of 1893, which ushered in what one historian calls "the anne terrible of American history between Reconstruction and the [First] World War." 123 Unemployment reached extraordinary levels that would not be seen again until the Great Depression, and disillusionment with the failure of government economic policies spilled into the streets. 124 It is rested, probably with the cooperation of local authorities, in order to test the law's validity.").
121. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266-67. 122. Ex parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131 (1887), also presented a version of this problem. Petitioners-including members of Lehr und Wehr Verein-were convicted of causing the Haymarket Riot, a labor protest in Chicago that led to several deaths. See Halbrook, supra note 112, at 980 (stating that the named party in Spies was a Lehr und Wehr Verein member); LaRue, supra note 23, at 388-89 (describing the Haymarket events in the context of larger labor unrest). While the case raised incorporation claims about trial procedures, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the petitioners' argument failed in part because of disdain toward their political attitudes. See Wildenthal, supra note 9, at 1485 ("Among other problems, the trial judge and jury were hopelessly biased against the defendants, jury selection was rigged, the prosecutor was allowed to indulge in outrageous misconduct and to introduce inflammatory and irrelevant evidence focusing on the defendants' unpopular political views, and the trial judge authorized the jury to convict on the basis of a startlingly farreaching and legally unfounded theory of conspiracy and accomplice liability."); see also Halbrook, supra note 112, at 985 ("[A]ll of the Haymarket defendants, after a public education campaign led in part by Clarence Darrow, would be pardoned posthumously in 1893 by Illinois Governor John Altgeld, on the basis of a total lack of evidence to convict them."). IN COURAGE 649 (1932) . 124. See HERBERT CROLY, MIARcus ALONZO HANNA: HIS LIFE AND WORK hard to overstate how much these events frightened the establishment and forced lawyers to rethink their assumptions about federalism.
ALLAN NEVINS, GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY
One source of this turmoil was the Populist Party, which was formed in 1891 as a vehicle for concerns about the decline of rural life in an era of industrialization.
12 5 The Populists argued that society's ills were the result of excessive concentration of wealth and power in private hands, and they therefore backed the imposition of an income tax, the free coinage of silver, and the nationalization of industry. 126 ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S PARTY 442-43 (1931) (quoting the Omaha Platform, a manifesto adopted by the Populist Party at their founding convention on July 4, 1892, which described the Populists' goals to "demand free and unlimited coinage of silver," and to nationalize railroads, the telegraph, telephones, and banks) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 440 (talking about the need to prevent "governmental injustice [that] breed[s] the two great classes-tramps and millionaires").
127. See, e.g., JOSEPH COLUMBUS MANNING, FADEOUT OF POPULISM 35 (1928) ("The Peoples Party . . . did bring to the South its first real democracy and the only democracy the South has ever known."); Magliocca, supra note 103, at 862 n.234 ("'We condemn lynching and demand of our public servants the rigid enforcement of our laws against this barbarous practice."' (quoting Georgia Populists Platform, PEOPLE'S PARTY PAPER, Sept. 11, 1896, at 8)); see also C. VANN WOODWARD, TOM WATSON: AGRARIAN REBEL 220 (1938) (quoting from Georgian Populist leader Tom Watson's statements to African-American and white voters in 1892 that "[y]ou are kept apart that you may be separately fleeced of your earnings. You are made to hate each other because upon that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of financial despotism which enslaves While the Populists always had an uneasy relationship with labor (after all, workers lived in cities), 12 8 these factions were able to forge an alliance of convenience as the Panic deepened. For instance, in 1894 a Populist activist named Jacob Coxey led a protest march of the unemployed to Washington, D.C., to call for increased spending on public works. 129 The New York Times called this march a "Battle between Law and Anarchy," and when the marchers arrived police greeted them with beatings and arrests. 130 Sympathy strikes quickly broke out across the nation, and one editorial lamented that "in no civilized country in this century, not actually in the throes of war or open insurrection, has society been so disorganized as it was in the United States during the first half of 1894."131 Never, it added, "did the constituted authorities appear so incompetent to enforce respect for the law." 132
Justice Brewer Thinks Aloud
The conservative reaction to these developments is exemplified by a speech Justice David Brewer gave to the New York State Bar Association in 1893.133 Just one year earlier, Brewer you both. You are deceived and blinded that you may not see how this race antagonism perpetuates a monetary system which beggars both") (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. See, e.g., RICHARD When Maxwell was decided at the end of the decade, however, Brewer did not dissent from the Court's ruling against the incorporation doctrine. 135 Accordingly, the New York Bar speech is worth examining for clues to explain why Justice Brewer, and by extension supporters of substantive incorporation, might have changed their minds.1 36 The theme of Brewer's address, entitled "The Nation's Safeguard," was that only property rights stood between anarchy and civilization.1 37 In blunt terms for a sitting Justice, he commented on the contemporary political scene: "Who does not hear the old demagogic cry, 'Vox populi vox Dei,' . . . constantly invoked to justify disregard of those guaranties [sic] which have hitherto been deemed sufficient to give protection to private property?" 138 Denouncing "the black flag of anarchism" and "the red flag of socialism," he asked, "[w]ho does not see the wide unrest that fills the land; who does not feel that vast social changes are impending, and realize that those changes must be guided in justice to safety and peace or they will culminate in revolution?"1 3 9
These fears of revolution, which were first suggested in Presser, raised the question of whether the Bill of Rights should 137. See FISS, supra note 24, at 53. 138. See STEPHENSON, JR., supra note 110, at 120. This concern for property rights runs through Justice Brewer's jurisprudence, and was on display in one of his prior dissents. See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection of him and his property, is both the limitation and duty of government. If it may regulate the price of one service, which is not a public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property which is not devoted to a public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all property?").
139. FISS, supra note 24, at 56-57. Fear of a breakdown in law and order reached a climax during the Pullman Strike of 1894, which paralyzed the nation and could only be put down by federal soldiers acting under an emergency decree. 142 This unprecedented disruption, which was aided and abetted by state officials, led to In re Debs 1 43 and marked a major shift in the meaning of federalism. While that trauma increased interest in expanding federal protection for property rights, it had the opposite effect when it came to other parts of the Bill of Rights.
Shutting Down the Railroads
The Pullman Strike began as a local dispute but escalated when Eugene V. Debs, the famed labor leader, called for a total boycott of Pullman's railroad cars. 144 Railroad traffic across the country soon ground to a halt, but Governor Altgeld of Illinois refused to intervene even though the strike was based in Chicago. 14 5 He explained that "local self government is a funda- 148. See PAPKE, supra note 24, at 33 (noting that eleven people were killed and fifty were wounded); see also Emergency Order, supra note 142, at 499 ("Those who disregard this warning and persist in taking part with a riotous mob in forcibly resisting and obstructing the execution of the laws of the United States .. . cannot be regarded otherwise than as public enemies.").
132
MINNESOTA
149. See, e.g., DELMORE ELWELL, A WALL STREET VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN ISSUES OF 1896, at 4 (1896) (discussing the "railroad strike riots of 1894" and stating that "[tihere are still a few blue-coated veterans of the Civil War who will . .. register a prayer for a revival of the spirit of 1860"); PAPKE, supra note 24, at 35 (observing that the nation was "fighting for its own existence just as truly as in suppressing the great rebellion") (internal quotation marks omitted). From a constitutional standpoint, the reaction against the Pullman Strike affected how people thought about federalism by emphasizing the fragility of property rights. In a sense, this harkened back to the Framers' view that the chief threat to personal rights came from the new federal government-hence the need for a Bill of Rights that applied only to federal actions-while the principal threat to property rights came from state governments, which is why the Contracts Clause and restrictions on paper money applied only to the states. 153 The struggle against slavery, though, convinced lawyers and citizens that the states also posed a threat to personal rights. This new concept of federalism motivated Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil:
[W]hen the late civil war closed, and slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, there was legislation in the former slaveholding States inconsistent with these rights, and a general apprehension arose in a portion of the country-whether justified or not is immaterial-that this legislation would still be enforced and the rights of the freedmen would not be respected. 154 The Pullman Strike turned this logic on its head. First, the inaction of state authorities in the face of what was seen as a local mob bent on confiscating property fit snugly into the Framers' view of federalism. Second, the strike implied that extending free speech, the right to bear arms, or the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures to the states would make it more likely that people like Debs would succeed in their redistributive aims.155 Finally, this episode undermined the logic of Slaughter-House, which held that common-law property rights were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment although personal rights could be.1 5 6 None of this boded well for substantive incorporation outside of property rights.
Debs and the Crackdown on Freedom
All of these threads came together in Debs, which rejected an appeal by the strike leaders of the contempt sanctions imposed upon them for failing to comply with the federal injunction.1 5 7 In their habeas claim, they argued that their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was denied 5 8 and that "[n]o more tyrannous and arbitrary government can be devised than the administration of criminal law by a single judge by means note 103, at 864-73 (discussing the decision and the rehearing petition). Pollock I reversed a century of judicial deference to congressional tax policy and rested on concern about the growing clamor for redistribution, which indicates the strong influence of political events on doctrine. See Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 608 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he result of the opinion ... just announced is to overthrow a long and consistent line of decisions, and to deny to the legislative department of the government the possession of a power conceded to it by universal consensus for one hundred years . . . ."); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & of injunction and proceedings in contempt." 1 5 9 Justice Brewer, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected this argument out of fear that a jury drawn from a venire in the heartland of the strike would not convict its leaders.
16 0 The Court stated that "[i]f all the inhabitants of a State, or even a great body of them, should combine to obstruct interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails, prosecutions for such offenses had in such a community would be doomed in advance to failure." 161 Thus, if a jury trial right were enforced, the "interests of the nation in these respects would be at the absolute mercy of a portion of the inhabitants of that single State." 162 In other words, juries were now dangerous. Debs's presumption of jury nullification was accompanied by fire-and-brimstone quotes about the threat of disorder (one of which appears at the start of this Article 6 3 ) that echoed what was said in Presser and in Justice Brewer's New York Bar speech. 164 For instance, the Court stated that "[i]f ever there was a special exigency, one which demanded that the court should do all that courts can do, it was disclosed by this bill, and we need not turn to the public history of the day, which only reaffirms with clearest emphasis all its allegations." 16 5 Even though Debs receives plenty of attention for its discussion of the Commerce Clause and its blessing of equitable action against strikes, 166 its implications for incorporation are just as important. If a constitutional right in federal court could not stand its ground against the argument that civil order was in peril, then how could the extension of that right (or almost any other part of the Bill of Rights) to the states move forward? Of course, one could say that Debs involved a procedural right, and thus the decision there might simply reflect the ho-hum at-159. PAPKE, supra note 24, at 64 (quoting from petitioners' brief) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 576-77 (noting petitioners' Sixth Amendment argument); JOSEPHSON, supra note 24, at 606 (stating that an injunction "was a formidable legal weapon, making possible imprisonment for contempt of court without a hearing, and without trial by jury, of those who organized labor action"). titude that the Justices took toward these kinds of claims. 16 Yet injunctions against strikes could also be seen-and were seen by at least some Populists-as a free speech issue, as they effectively barred workers from persuading their fellow citizens through protests.1 6 8 Either way, Debs crystallized the doubts about the Bill of Rights in this era and laid the foundation for the burial of incorporation and rebirth of the Fourteenth Amendment as a device for protecting property rights.
C. THE TRANSFORMATION OF SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
Not long after the defeat of William Jennings Bryan and his allies in the 1896 presidential election, the Justices embarked on significant doctrinal changes that embodied the postPullman spirit of federalism. 169 The centerpiece of this effort was the Court's expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property rights through the incorporation of the Takings Clause 7 o and the creation of the "liberty of contract." 17 1 Though the former act was consistent with the doctrinal pattern distinguishing substantive and procedural incorporation claims, the latter decision emptied Slaughter-House of its original content and opened up the case for reconsideration in Max- CONCLUSION This Article sought to clear up some myths about incorporation and clarify what the Justices will face when they decide the Second Amendment's application to the states. One important lesson is that Slaughter-House was not hostile to the extension of the Bill of Rights until 1900 and hence cannot be blamed for the delay in that development. Another takeaway is that, prior to Maxwell, courts were more supportive of substantive incorporation claims than procedural ones. Finally, the decline of substantive incorporation in the late nineteenth century (outside of the Takings Clause) is largely attributable to the reaction against protests in the mid-1890s and the fear that extending new legal protections against state action would be dangerous.
What do these principles tell us about how the Supreme Court should view a Second Amendment incorporation claim? First, this is one of the few substantive portions of the Bill of Rights that have not overcome the hostility toward incorporation generated by the backlash against the Populists and labor. 188 This exception is hard to justify more than a century after William Jennings Bryan's defeat in the 1896 campaign. Second, a review of the Court's Second Amendment decisions from the 1870s until the 1890s, which are the only ones that address incorporation, shows that there is no holding rejecting the idea. 189 Consequently, this historical inquiry counsels in favor of a conclusion that the Second Amendment should be extended against the states to join its compatriots in textual freedom. 
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